Firewall-on-Demand

GRNET's approach to advanced network security services' management via bgp flow-spec and NETCONF

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SEE 2/RIPE NCC Regional Meeting - April 2013



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Motivation

- Better tools to mitigate *transient* attacks and anomalies (eg DDoS, spambots, viruses, scans, ...),
- "Better" in terms of
 - Granularity: Per-flow level (Source/Dest IP/Ports, protocol type, DSCP, TCP flag, fragment encoding, ...),
 - Action: Drop, rate-limit, redirect,
 - Speed: quicker (seconds/minutes rather than hours/days)
 - Efficiency: closer to the source, multidomain
 - Automation: integration (eg IDS/IPS, log analyzers,...)
 - Manageability: UI, web, AAI



BGP FlowSpec

RFC 5575, August 2009: "Dissemination of flow specification rules with BGP"

Allows BGP to propagate an n-tuple filter with flow matching criteria and actions

- matching criteria: a combination of source/dest prefix, source/dest port, ICMP type/code, packet size, DSCP, TCP flag, fragment encoding, etc ... , E.g.:
 - all packets to 10.0.0.1/24 and TCP port 25
 - all packets to 10.0.0.1/24 from 192.0.0.0/8 and destination port (range [137, 139] or 8080),
- Filtering actions: accept, discard, rate-limit, sample, redirect, etc ...
- Information independent of unicast routing (different NLRI), but it is automatically validated against unicast routing.



Advantages of signaling via BGP

- Incremental addition to deployed mechanisms,
- Complexity/scalability issues already solved, flexibility of BGP in adding new services (Multicast, IPv6, L3 VPN, L2 VPN, VPLS),
- Reuse of:
 - internal route distribution infrastructure (e.g.: route reflector or confederation design)
 - existing external relationships (e.g.: inter-domain BGP sessions to a customer network)
- Trust model in place
 - normally follows (the well-established trust of) unicast routing
 - Accept filter when advertised by next-hop for the destination prefix (compare destination address of traffic filtering rule with best match unicast route for this prefix)
 - Originator of filter and unicast route must be same
 - No more specifics from a different AS.
 - Can be overridden



Comparing BGP flowspec with

- **Traditional Firewalls, ACLs** (Complementary technologies, rather than competitive)
 - No expensive, dedicated hardware
 - Distributed applied as soon as traffic enters the network
 - Actions closer to source
 - Fine-grained
 - Multidomain —easy propagation towards the upstream
 - Easy automation & integration

BGP blackhole routing

- ► Flowspec → enhancement of BGP blackhole routing:
- Less coarse
- More actions
- Separate NLRI



BGP FlowSpec Status

Vendor support:

- Juniper: Supported in JUNOS since 7.3 !!!!
- Cisco: Not supported, no official plan ... But participates in the RFC
- Other big vendors: No
- But: Supported by Quagga, ExaBGP and some other routing daemons,
- IPv6 support: No



Design Principles (1)

Goal: A service that will allow GRNET customers to mitigate transient attacks & anomalies at their upstream (GRNET) level. NOT a permanent firewalling service. Rules should be removed at the end of the attack (otherwise auto-expire).

- Target audience: GRNET customers (NOCs)
- Target network: GRNET
- Web-based tool, shibboleth authentication of the users
- Customers control internal access via appropriate "Entitlement"



Design Principles (2)

Functionality:

- Transient firewall filters across all GRNET routers,
- Empowered by BGP flowspec
- Flow granularity:
 - Source/Destination IPs
 - Source/Destination ports
 - More to be added in later versions (eg TCP flags)

Flow Manipulation:

- Drop
- Rate limit to: 10Mbps. 1Mbps, 100Kbps (we can add as many as we want),
- More actions in later versions, eg redirect
- Authorization & Security
 - \blacktriangleright Customers \rightarrow affect traffic destined to themselves
 - Core network → immune to the tool (in case of bug, misbehavior, compromise)

Design Principles (3)

- Programmatic API
 - REST API to be added in future versions, in order to allow integration with other tools
- Coding:
 - Secure
 - Based on modern technologies,
 - Open: Open-source license, well-documented, no GRNET-specifics or hardwired stuff
- Synergies:
 - Customers
 - GEANT & NRENs
 - ► GRNET or 3rd party security tools. CERT/CIRTs, IPS/IDS, ...







User logs in a web tool and describes flows and actions

Destination validated against user's IP space



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End of attack: Removal via the tool, or auto-expire



User Interface #1





User Interface #2

grnet	M	y profile Overvi	iew Admin	Language: English *		leopoul@g	Logout
Firewall o	n Demand						
My rules							
My rules							Console Add Rule
		- And	kin Sussanded	Error Depileo			
Display 25 • rules		Acc	we Suspended	Error Periodity		Search:	
Name 0	Match φ	Then 🕴	Status ≬	Applier 💧	Expires	Response	Actions
IERSD_wfi_AP_TXC5TT	Dist Addir:194.177. Sirc Addir:0.0.0.00 Protocol:lemp Protocol:tep Protocol:udp	rate-limit:100k	SUSPENDED	nmilas	26 Mar 13	Rule expired	Reactivate
dns_amp_odrogos_JU36SA	Dst Addr:83.212.5 Src Addr:0.0.000 Protocol:udp Src Port:53	discard	SUSPENDED	karafot@r	20 Mar 13	Rule expired	Reactivate
test1_NPMWSV	Dst Addr:155.207.112 Src Addr:0.0.0.00 Protocol:iemp Protocol:tep Protocol:udp	discard	SUSPENDED	harb@"	22 Feb 13	Rule expired	Reactivate



User Interface #3

gr	net My profile Overview Admin Language: English* leopoul@gmet-hq.admin.gmet.gr Logout									
Firewall on Demand										
My rules / Create rule										
Apply for a new rule										
Rule Basic Info										
Name										
	A unique identifier will be added as a name_suffix									
Admin Options										
Applier leopoid@gmet-hq.admin.gmet.gr										
Rule Match Conditions										
Source Address										
Destination Address	Nerwork address. Use address-User notation									
	Network address Use address/CIDB notation									
Protocol	icmp									
	tep udp									
Ports	Advanced Settings (Ports)									
Rule Actions										
Then	dacand na hitika									
Expiration										
Expires	2013-04-04									
Use/Comments										
		rnet								

User Interface #4

Firewa	et all on Demand	My profile Overvi	ew Admin	Language: English •	leopoul@g	Logout
My rules						
y rules						EConsole CAdd Rule
solav 25 🔹 rules	Console	Acti	suenended	Error Danting	Search:	
Name	[2013-03-21 01:01:	16]: [karaliot@gr	Status 🔅] Suspending rule : dns_a Applier	np_cdrogos_JU36SA Reason: EXPIR Expires Response	ED - Result Successfully Actions
nmamalis_YEQXVM	D st Addr 82 S to Addr 82 Photocollemp					
gv5_LLUAHY	E st Addr.193.105 Sho Addr.91.2					
gv4_FN5SS3	E st Abdr:193.105. men states Sho Addr:113.tratesmuch					
egv2_Z168K4	Dst Addr:193.105.1	discard	SUSPENDED	costasd@g	r 30 Nov 12 Rule expired	Reactivate



User Interface #5

My rules						
ly rules						Console Add Rule
	Suspend Rule X					
splay 25 📩 rules	You are about to suspend rule leopoul_test_rule_2PROLS	_) inded	Error Pending		Search:	
Name 🔶	Suspending the rule will automatically remove the	s 🔺	Applier $~~$	Expires	Response	Actions
eopoul_test_rule_2PROLS	inactive.	E	leopoul@g	04 Apr 13	Successfully committed	Edit Suspend
ERSD_wifi_AP_TXC5TT	Suspend Cancel	DED	nm 🧠	26 Mar 13	Rule expired	Reactivate



Demo (iperf simulated attack)

[3] local ======	port 56	01 connected with	port 38071	6	
[ID] Interval	Transfer	Bandwidth Jitter	Lost/Total Datagrams		
[3] 0.0- 1.0 sec	11.8 MBytes	99.2 Mbits/sec 0.109 ms	101/ 8539 (1.2%)		
[3] 1.0- 2.0 sec	11.8 MBytes	99.0 Mbits/sec 0.096 ms	123/ 8539 (1.4%)		
[3] 2.0- 3.0 sec	11.8 MBytes	98.7 Mbits/sec 0.126 ms	121/ 8518 (1.4%)		
[3] 3.0- 4.0 sec	11.4 MBytes	96.0 Mbits/sec 0.115 ms	349/ 8514 (4.1%)		
[3] 4.0- 5.0 sec	10.7 MBytes	90.1 Mbits/sec 0.110 ms	843/ 8586 (9.9%)		
[3] 5.0- 6.0 sec	11.8 MBytes	99.2 Mbits/sec 0.106 ms	51/ 8490 (0.6%)		A TUUNDDS
[3] 6.0- 7.0 sec	11.8 MBytes	99.2 Mbits/sec 0.106 ms	111/ 8546 (1.3%)		
[3] 7.0-8.0 sec	11.8 MBytes	98.9 Mbits/sec 0.098 ms	137/ 8548 (1.6%)		attaal
[3] 8.0- 9.0 sec	11.2 MBytes	94.3 Mbits/sec P .97 ms	5347 BEAP		allack
[3] 9.0-10.0 sec	11.8 MBytes	99.1 Mbits/sec 105 ms	54/ 8481 (0.64%)		
3] 10.0-11.0 sec	12.0 MBytes	100 Mbits/sec 0.096 ms	6/8544 (0.07%)		
3] 11.0-12.0 sec	11.9 MBytes	100 Mb1ts/sec 0.091 ms	7/ 8510 (0.082%)		
3] 12.0-13.0 sec	11.9 MBytes	99.5 Mbits/sec 0.113 ms	90/ 8548 (1.1%)		
3] 13.0-14.0 sec	12.0 MBytes	100 MD1ts/sec 0.092 ms	5/ 8538 (0.059%)		
3] 14.0-15.0 sec	11.7 Mbytes	97.6 MD1t5/Sec 0.104 ms	229/ 054/ (2.7%)		
3] 15.0-16.0 sec	11.9 MBytes	100 MD1ts/sec 0.089 ms	10/ 8530 (0.12%)		
3] 16.0-17.0 sec	11.3 MBytes	94.4 MD1ts/sec 0.153 Ms	440/ 8469 (5.2%)		
3] 17.0-10.0 Sec	12.1 MBytes	101 Mbits/sec 0.123 ms	17/ 9541 (0.26)		
31 10 0 20 0	11.5 Hbytes	100 PD105/SEC 0.105 IIS	443 (0546 (5.2%)		
1 31 19.0-20.0 SPC	10.6 MPutor	90.0 Mbstc/coc 0.049 mc	000/ 0470 (110)	User presses "Apply"	
31 20.0-21.0 SEC	10.0 Hoytes	03.0 HDICS/SEC 0.040 IIS	300/ 04/3 (115)	in rule creation form	
3] 21.0-22.0 sec	10.1 Hoyces	09.2 Mbits/sec 0.009 ms	A47/ 8992 (5%)	in rule creation form	
21 22 0 24 0 600	11 9 MDutos	00 1 Mbitc/coc 0 005 mc	116/ 9544 (1 45)		
31 24 8 25 8 sec	12.0 MBytes	100 Mbits/sec 0.093 ms	0/ 8545 (8%)		True in all to
1 31 25 0 26 0 500	11 7 MByter	08 0 Mbits/sec 0 101 ms	101/ 8528 (2.26)		
31 26 8-27 A sec	11 4 MBytes	95 5 Mhits/sec A 13A ms	425/ 8543 (5%)		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
31 27 8.28 8 580	11 9 MBytes	99 8 Mbits/sec 8 189 ms	58/ 8548 (0.68%)		loop them
31 28 0.29 0 sec	11.1 MBytes	92.8 Mbits/sec 0.094 ms	668/ 8547 (7.7%)		r less than
31 29.0-30.0 sec	12.0 MBytes	100 Mbits/sec 0.108 ms	8/ 8546 (0.094%)		
31 30.0.31.0 sec	12.0 MBytes	100 Mbits/sec 0.108 ms	14/ 8540 (0.16%)		15 cocondo
31 31.0-32.0 sec	11.7 MBytes	98.5 Mbits/sec 0.121 ms	167/ 8544 (2%)	Rule is propagated via	
1 31 32 0-33 0 sec	9.80 MBytes	82.2 Mbits/sec 0.118 ms	18/ 7008 (0.14%)	aBCD to care router	
f 31 33.0-34.0 sec	12.9 KBytes	106 Kbits/sec 0.121 ms	8992/ 9001 (le+02%)	ebor to core router.	
1 31 34.0-35.0 Sec	12.9 NDYLES	100 NUILS/SEC 0.100 IIS	920// 9210 (1C+02%)	Attack is mitigated	-
3] 35.0-36.0 sec	10.0 KBytes	82.3 Kbits/sec 0.088 ms	7369/ 7376 (le+02%)	(rate limit)	
[3] 36.0-37.0 sec	12.9 KBytes	106 Kbits/sec 0.077 ms	9208/ 9217 (1e+02%)	(rate innit)	
[3] 37.0-38.0 sec	12.9 KBytes	106 Kbits/sec 1.075 ms	9211/ 9220 (1e+02%)		
[3] 38.0-39.0 sec	10.0 KBytes	82.3 Kbits/sec 0.725 ms	7369/ 7376 (le+02%)		
[3] 39.0-40.0 sec	12.9 KBytes	106 Kbits/sec 0.468 ms	9173/ 9182 (le+02%)		
[3] 40.0-41.0 sec	12.9 KBytes	106 Kbits/sec 0.297 ms	8921/ 8930 (le+02%)		
[3] 41.0-42.0 sec	10.0 KBytes	82.3 Kbits/sec 0.237 ms	7388/ 7395 (1e+02%)		
3] 42.0-43.0 sec	12.9 KBytes	106 Kbits/sec	9110/ 9119 (le+02%)		
3] 43.0-44.0 sec	10.0 KBytes	82.3 Kbits/sec 0.3.9 ms	//////////////////////////////////////		
3] 44.0-45.0 sec	12.9 KBytes	106 KD115/sec 0.228 ms	9183/ Sale (e+82%)		
3] 45.0-46.0 sec	12.9 KBytes	106 KD1ts/sec 0.178 ms	9042/ 9051 (Ie+u.	-	
3] 46.0-47.0 sec	11.5 KBytes	94.1 KDICS/Sec 0.140 ms	/206/ /214 (18+02%)		
3] 47.0-48.0 sec	12.9 KBytes	100 KD105/Sec 0.182 ms	0107/ 0205 (10+02%)		Flow
31 40 0 50 0 sec	12.9 KBytes	100 ND115/SEC 0.522 ms	7260/ 7267 (10:020)		FIOW
31 49:0-50.0 Sec	12.0 KBytes	100 Kbite (and 1 402 m	0003/0103 (1=025)		
31 51 0 52 0 coc	12.9 KBytes	106 Kbits/sec 1.493 ms	0295/ 0294 (10+02%)		limited to
31 52 8.53 8 sec	18 8 KBytes	82 3 Khite/sec 1 188 ms	7189/ 7195 (16+02%)		
1 31 53 0 54 0 cm	12.9 KBytes	106 Khite/coc 0 658 m	9148/ 9157 (10+026)		10010
31 54 A.55 A sec	18 A KBytes	87 3 Khits/sec 0.038 lls	7347/ 7354 (10+82%)		100Khps
31 55 8.56 8 560	12 9 KBytes	186 Khits/sec 6 294 ms	8667/ 8671 (10+87%)		1001000
31 56 0.57 0 sec	12.9 KBytes	106 Khits/sec 3.972 ms	9068/ 9077 (1e+02k)		
31 57.0-58.0 sec	10.0 KBytes	82.3 Kbits/sec 2.983 ms	6965/ 6972 (1e+02%)		
31 58.0-59.0 sec	12.9 KBytes	106 Kbits/sec 3.221 ms	8780/ 8789 (1e+02%)		arnet
1 31 59.0-60.0 sec	12.9 KBytes	106 Kbits/sec 2.174 ms	8521/ 8530 (1e+02%)		y griner

Διασυνδέοντας την Έρευνα και την Εκπαίδευση

Implementation - Architecture





Implementation - Technologies

- Open Source project
 - Python Django ORM
 - jQuery Javascript lib, Bootstrap CSS
- Multicomponent architecture
 - Shibboleth: User authentication based on special attribute
 - Django: UI rendering & db modeling
 - Long polling: fetch updates without reloading
 - used in: facebook chat, twitter updates
 - Celery/beanstalk: apply configuration without locks
 - nxpy: Network XML to python classes proxy
 - Dev & maint by GRNET NOC delevoper (Leonidas Poulopoulos)
 - Ncclient: python netconf client (ncclient)
 - Maintained by GRNET NOC delevoper (Leonidas Poulopoulos)
 - Caching, cron jobs



Information Flow

- User login
- Rule management (Creation, removal)
- Notifications, status
- Transform rules to python objects
- DB operations
- Transform python objects to netconf XML configuration
- Apply XML configuration via NETCONF to device
- Save received configuration to device (switch)
- Propagate rule via eBGP to peer routers
- Rule filters and acts on matching flows



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Status

- Latest stable
- Production GRNET network
- http://fod.grnet.gr/
- Successful mitigation of aprox. 20 attacks in 2 months



- Source code:
 - http://code.grnet.gr/







Phase 1: GEANT participation

- Routers accept BGP flowspec NLRI
- Establish BGP peerings with GRNET (protected by route-maps)



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- Routers accept BGP flowspec NLRI
- Establish BGP peerings with GRNET (protected by route-maps)
- GRNET filters are applied at GEANT level
- Phase 2: NREN participation
 - ► NRENs → propagate filters through bgp peerings instead of UI





Synergies with security team

- Connect to the domain's IPS/IDS, honeypots, ...
- Connect to GEANT anomaly detection tool
- Connect to any CERT/CIRT team that we trust

"Soft" actions can make adoption easier

Rate-limit instead of drop



Service Outreach

Project is open-source Requirements to run the service:

- Juniper on your network
- A vm to host the service
- A juniper router, dedicated to the service
 - L3 switches are sufficient
 - A "virtual router" (olive VM) could also be used
- Shibboleth recommended (but can be ommited)
- DB: customers \rightarrow IP space (auth)
 - whois \rightarrow DB is implemented

Still in doubt?

- ► Try the existing instance of the service (@GRNET) on **your** network
- Multihop-BGP peering between our service and your routers
- BGP filters (on your side) can be used to restrict the effects on a specific "testing" IP range.

Thank you

Questions?

Work carried-out by Leonidas Poulopoulos, Michalis Mamalis & Andreas Polyrakis

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